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Introduction
An active literature has developed examining the influence of Independent Nonexecutive Directors, INEDs, (we use INEDs and outside independent directors interchangeably) on the performance of publicly listed firms. It has been often stated that INEDs can play an important role in monitoring management actions (Fama, 1980) , and provide expert knowledge and business networking useful for management. Mace (1986) claims that board directorship can be a source of prestige and business contact which may induce CEOs to accept outside directorships. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) suggest that the quality of the board of directors, amongst other variable may also signal the quality of the firm. Shivdasani (1993) suggests the number of additional board seats held by the appointee as a measure of an individual director's reputation. Booth and Deli (1996) find monetary rewards and perquisites do not appear to attract highly compensated CEOs to outside directorships. One the other hand, Yermack (2004) suggests that remuneration linked to firm's performance can impact outside directors' incentive and decision to retain their directorship. Fich (2005) , using data from Fortune 1000 boards, suggests that CEOs of well-performing firms are more likely to gain outside directorships to signal to the market better future prospects for the appointing firm. Thus, it appears that the reputations of INEDs are related to the "reputations" of the appointing firms and that the decisions of prestigious INEDs to join the boards is related to the firms' quality.
In light of the above, this paper examines empirically the relationship between the reputations of the INEDs and appointing firms' characteristics. The paper first addresses the effect of INEDs' reputations (prestige) in the pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). Numerous studies have appeared in the past three decades addressing the pricing of IPOs. Of particular interest is the persistent observed phenomenon of IPO underpricing, defined as the negative difference between IPOs' offering price and the closing price of the first day of trading. For instance, Ritter (1984) finds average underpricing of 18.8 percent for approximately 5,000 firms that went public between the years 1960 and 1982 in the United States. Similarly, Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988) find that the average first-day IPO return is 16.3%. McGuinness (1992) researchers is why high quality and low risk issuers willingly "leave money on the table" for new investors and whether there are ways to minimize this underpricing effect 3 . Rock (1986) suggests that the underpricing phenomenon is associated with information asymmetry between the informed versus the less informed investors and the perceived risks -greater the perceived risk, the great the underpricing. Balver et al.
(1988), Beatty (1989) , and Carter and Manaster (1990) , theorize that quality issuers attempt to minimize the costly underpricing through the use of reputable intermediates such as underwriters and auditors. Other researchers, Allen and Faulhaber (1989) , Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) , and Welch (1989) suggest that firms with good future prospects use underpricing to signal quality in which bad quality firms cannot easily mimic. Baron (1982) , on the other hand suggests that this underpricing anomaly is due to a principal-agent problem between the underwriters and the issuers. However, none of these studies link the reputation of INEDs to IPO underpricing. In this paper we posit that the appointment of prestigious INEDs should convey quality and thus reduce the IPO underpricing because uninformed investors presume prestigious INEDs are better informed of the future prospect of the issuers and, perhaps more importantly, have their own reputation to protect. This concept is similar to the notion of reputation signaling developed by Klein and Leffler (1981) where they demonstrate that a non-salvageable capital expenditure can serve as an effective bond to guarantee the quality of a firm's product.
We also examine market's reaction to appointments and resignations of prestigious
INEDs. Past studies addressing this issue are inconclusive. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) , using NYSE and the American Stock Exchange data for the years 1981 to 1985, 1 In Hong Kong, the offering price is determined between the issuer and its underwriter following the IPO book-building process. This implies there is no fixed pricing for the offered share shares prior to the book-building discovery phase. Instead the issuer will provide an indicative price band to establish the ultimate price. Once the price of the offer is fixed, the number of shares allocated to investors is determined at the sole discretion of the issuer in consultation with the underwriter. Furthermore, all IPOs are done on a non-committed basis. 2 December 30, 2005 3 Ljungqvist (2005) provides a good summary of the past IPO underpricing literature report a positive cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the appointment of prestigious outside directors to corporate boards. However, Fich and Shivdasani (2004) find the market reacts negatively to the appointment of INEDs that have more than three existing directorships. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find that outgoing directors are more likely to be replaced by directors with similar characteristics -for instance, prestige replaced by prestige, CEOs replaced by CEOs.
In this paper we test the market's reaction by thoroughly documenting the attributes of
INEDs based on hand collected data from Hong Kong. The question is why Hong Kong?
Hong Kong is ideally suited for this study for five reasons. First, even though Hong Kong, until June 30, 1997, was a British colony for nearly one hundred and fifty years, its basic cultural philosophy follows the traditional Chinese Confucian values where personal reputation and relationships are fundamental to all aspects of commercial and social intercourse 4 . Bond and King (1985) and Bond (1996) The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the key hypotheses. Section 3 presents our methodology, data and variables. Empirical results are shown in section 4. Conclusions and limitations are discussed in Section 5.
Main Hypotheses

INEDs and IPO Underpricing
We examine the reputation effect for prestigious INEDs to join the firms during the period of IPO "window dressing" process. This concept is similar to prior IPO underpricing "endorsement or certification" studies which suggest that by selecting prestigious auditors and underwriters, the IPO underpricing is reduced (Beatty and Ritter (1986) , Beatty (1989) , Carter and Manaster (1990) , Ng et al. (1994) and Michaely and Shaw (1995) ). Thus our first hypothesis is that there is a negative relationship between the prestige of individuals appointed as INEDs and perceived risk of firms. Prior studies suggest six relevant measures for risk: leverage ratio and ROA (e.g., Michaely and Shaw, 1995) , firm size (e.g., Ritter, 1984) , underwriter reputation and auditor reputation (e.g., Beatty, 1989, and Michaely and Shaw, 1994) and after market standard deviation (Beatty, 1989) . A higher leverage ratio (total debt over total assets) and a lower return on asset, ROA, (net income over total assets) are associated with riskier firms. Larger IPOs (measured by the total capital raised at IPO) are perceived as less risky. It is important to note the effects of risk/cost to investors, INEDs and issuers are different.
Investors are concerned with the loss of their investments whereas INEDs are concerned with the loss of their reputation. For the issuers, their cost is the "money that is left on the <Insert Table 2> Auditor Reputation Ranking:
INED (non-replacement) Appointment After 2003
To rank the audit firm's reputation, we adopt a three tier scheme similar to Michaely and Shaw (1995) . We assign the Big-Four (previously the Big-Eight) to Tier-1 (most prestigious) auditors. To differentiate the Tier-2 auditors from the Tier-3 (least prestigious) auditors, we asked 10 Hong Kong accounting professionals to segregate all IPO auditors, other than the Big-Four, into two distinct groups according to their perceived market reputations. We also calculate the auditors' reputation ranking using the number of IPO clients and total funds raised. We assume more prestigious INEDs are more likely to choose a firm with a higher ranked auditor. It is, however, interesting to note that in Hong Kong the Big-Four auditing firms dominated most of the new listings -92.5 percent by clients and 99.5 by funds raised (see Table 3 ). Thus, any empirical study involving reputation of auditors at IPO for Hong Kong is not meaningful as virtually all issuers use only top tier auditors.
<Insert Table 3> Underwriter Reputation Ranking: Goldman Sachs a combined score of 6. The subgroup with the lowest score is designated Tier-1 (highest reputation) and the subgroup with the highest score designated as Tier-3. The final reputation ranking is shown in Table 4 . We assume more prestigious INEDs are more likely to choose firms with higher ranked underwriters.
<Insert Table 4> Stock Performance Data:
The stock performance (daily stock price, stock return, market capitalization, etc) is extracted from Datastream database. The accounting information (total assets, total debt, and net income) is collected from firms' prospectuses or Worldscope database.
Other variables are discussed in the following three sections separately. Table 5 summarizes the industry distribution by firm and by INED for each part of our study.
<Insert Table 5> 3.
INEDs and IPO Underpricing
Our The underpricing of an IPO issue is calculated as the return on the first day of trading (relative to the offering price):
where:
Rt 1 = the return (underpricing) of the IPOs on the first trading day P i1 = the closing price of stock i on the first day P i0 = the offering price of stock i.
We also adjust the return for the market effect:
AdjRt 1 = the market-adjusted return (underpricing) of IPOs on the first trading day R i,m1 = the market return on the first trading day of the new issue i.
Other variables used to test our hypotheses H1a and H2b are explained as follows:
Mscore is the average score of all INEDs in the same firm before IPO and is use to proxy the reputation of all INEDs. This firm-level approach reduces the potential bias resulting from having a single very prestigious INED dominating the study results.
However, for robustness checks, we also use the highest score among the INEDs for the same firm. The results, not shown in this paper, are similar and consistent.
Total Assets 13 is used to control for firms' size and proxy for risk. Larger firms are considered to have lower risk. We use Log of the total assets in our regressions. We expect larger firms are positively related to higher Mscore.
Leverage is calculated as total debt over total assets. Firms with higher leverage are considered to have higher risk. We expect higher leverages are negatively correlated with Mscore.
ROA is calculated as net income before extraordinary items over total assets. It is a proxy for firm's performance as well as bankruptcy risk. We expect ROA is positively correlated with Mscore.
SD is the standard deviation of daily returns for days 2-11 after the first trading day, which is used as an ex post proxy to control for ex ante uncertainty for our sample. We expect SD is negatively correlated with Mscore. 13 Instead of using Total Assets in the IPO session, we also tried Capital, a measurement of the offering size (the total funds raised by the IPO). Statistically there's no difference in analysis results.
Market return is the market return in the period between offering and listing. Tier-3 Group also exhibit higher leverage and lower past market return than Tier-1
Group but the difference is statistically insignificant. Table 7 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in our underpricing analysis.
<Insert Tables 1.6 and 1.7>
INED (non-replacement) Appointment After 2003
The We use standard event study methodology to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns for the periods around the announcement date of INED appointment.
The ex post abnormal returns (AR it ) are calculated as:
where R it and R mt are the daily return of the firm associated with announcement i at time t and the daily market index return at time t, respectively. 16 The cumulative abnormal return (CAR i ) between any two dates T 1 and T 2 is calculated as:
In addition to the accounting variables discussed in the previous section, we define three variables to indicate the firms' previous quality and other attributes of the newly appointed INEDs.
Qualified is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm received at least one qualified opinion statement during the past three years prior to the new appointment, 0 otherwise.
We expect a negative effect on CARs when Qualified is 1.
Board Size is the total number of the existing directors on the board -including executive and non-executive chairman and vice chairman, executive and non-executive directors, directors, and INEDs but excluding alternate directors. Board Size can be a proxy for firm size.
Number of INEDs is the number of INEDs on the board prior to the new appointment of the INED.
Required is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the INED is appointed to fulfill the stock exchange's requirement of having at least three INEDs or at least one qualified 16 To estimate the specific parameters in an ordinary least squares regression of α and β, we use 200 daily returns beginning with day -220 and ending with -21 relative to the announcement date.
member in Audit Committee, and 0 otherwise. We expect the market reaction is stronger Table 9 provides the correlation matrix of all variables used in our CAR analysis.
<Inset Tables 1.8 <Insert Table 10> 4. Empirical Results
INEDs and IPO Underpricing
We first examine INEDs' decisions to join boards. As posited by our hypothesis H1a, prestigious individuals are more likely to accept board appointments if the inviting firm is perceived to be less risky. The following is our regression model: Similar to Michaely and Shaw (1995), we proxy for risk using a) firm size (LogAssets), b) level of debt (Leverage) and c) return on asset (ROA). Regression I of Table 11 reports our regression results. LogAssets is significantly positive at the 1 percent level, suggesting prospective prestigious INEDs are more likely to be attracted to large firms.
Leverage is significantly negative at 1 percent level, which again shows prospective <Insert Table 11> We next examine how the reputation of the INEDs can influence the IPO underpricing level. Our regression model is as follow: The results are reported under Regression II of Table 11 . As expected, the coefficient of Therefore, we conclude that Hypothesis H1b is supported.
INED (non-replacement) Appointment After 2003
As shown in Panel A of Table 9 shows, Board Size can be another proxy for firm size (Total Assets). Moreover, H-share and red chip firms appear to have more prestigious INEDs. One possible explanation is that H-share firms and red chip firms are perceived to be more prestigious by INEDs because these firms tend to be large State-owned Enterprises from China. I, therefore, conclude that Hypothesis H2a is supported since both regressions suggest prestigious
INEDs prefer less risky firms.
<Insert Table 13> Regressions III and IV examine the market reaction on announcement day. In Thus, our study of the announcement effect of INED replacement yields no result, and we conclude that our hypothesis H3 is not supported.
INED Replacement
<Insert Table 14> Table 2 for details). One may deduce that some individuals, do in fact, accept or seek directorships to enhance their own personal prestige and extend their business network as suggested by Mace (1986) . Contrary to subsequent appointments for seasoned firms, the market is indifferent to the appointment of busy
Conclusions and limitations
INEDs at the time of IPO. This finding also is consistent with Bond's (1991) observation that "name dropping, eagerness to associate with the rich and famous, use of external status symbols, lavish gift giving, and use of titles" are deeply ingrained in the Chinese culture. Our study, due to insufficient compensation data at this time 18 , is unable to confirm whether monetary rewards and perquisites are significant inducements for individuals to accept directorships (Booth and Deli (1996) and Yermack (2004) [22] Grant Thornton and The University of Hong Kong, PRIMA global research paper:
The family and the business survey -to explore the key concerns of owner managers in Hong Kong.
[ Source: David M. Webb Table 3 Auditor Rankings
The Big-Four (previously the Big-Eight auditing firms) are assigned to Tier-1 (most prestigious) auditors. To differentiate the Tier-2 auditors from the Tier-3 (least prestigious) auditors, 10 Hong Kong accounting professional segregate all IPO auditors, other than the Big-Fours, into two distinct groups according to their perceived market reputation. Each auditor is assigned a unique score -lowest score being the most prestigious. Auditor reputation is also ranked according to the number of their IPO clients and total funds raised. Again each auditor is assigned a unique score -lowest score being the most prestigious. The two scores are added to give the final score. It is interesting to note that in Hong Kong the Big-Four auditing firms dominated most the new listings -92.5 percent by clients and 99.5 by funds raised (see Table 2 ).
Auditor Name clients client % The sample consists of 162 IPOs on the Hong Kong Exchange between 1999 and 2005. INED information is collected from firms' prospectuses, "Change in Directorships" section of the SEHK website (www.sehk.com.hk) and from David Webb's website (www.webb-site.com.hk). Accounting information is from firms' prospectuses. The stock information is from Datastream database. Mscore is the average score of the INEDs in the same firm before IPO. Assets is the firm's total assets before IPO. Leverage is calculated as total debt over total assets. ROA is calculated as net income before extraordinary items over total assets. H/Red is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the firms are either H-share firm or Red Chip firm, 0 otherwise. SD is the standard deviation of daily returns for days 2-11 after the first trading day. Market return is the market return in the period between offering and listing. F-Busy is a dummy variable which equals to 1 when there is at least one INED is busy INED in the firm, 0 otherwise. Auditor rank and underwriter rank are described in Table 2 and Table 3 . R t1 is the underpricing level of the first trading day. AdjR t1 is the market adjusted underpricing level of the first trading day. R t10 is the underpricing level till the 10 th trading day. R t30 is the underpricing level till the 30 th trading day. R t60 is the underpricing level till the 60 th trading day. T-test is applied. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Assets is the firm's total assets before IPO. ROA is calculated as net income before extraordinary items over total assets. H/Red is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the firms are either H-share firm or Red Chip firm, 0 otherwise. SD is the standard deviation of daily returns for days 2-11 after the first trading day. Market return is the market return in the period between offering and listing. Busy is a dummy variable which equals to 1 when there is at least one INED is busy INED in the firm, 0 otherwise. Auditor rank and underwriter rank are described in Table  2 and Table 3 . R t1 is the underpricing level of the first trading day. AdjR t1 is the market adjusted underpricing level of the first trading day. R t10 is the underpricing level till the 10 th trading day. R t30 is the underpricing level till the 30 th trading day. R t60 is the underpricing level till the 60 th trading day. Leverage is calculated as total debt over total assets. ROA is calculated as net income before extraordinary items over total assets. SD is the standard deviation of daily returns for days 2-11 after the first trading day. Market return is the market return in the period between offering and listing. F-Busy is a dummy variable which equals to 1 when there is at least one INED is busy INED in the firm, 0 otherwise. H/Red is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the firms are either H-share firm or Red Chip firm, 0 otherwise. Auditor rank and underwriter rank are described in Table 2 and Table 3 . R t1 is the underpricing level of the first trading day. AdjR t1 is the market adjusted underpricing level of the first trading day. R t10 is the underpricing level till the 10 th trading day. T-test is applied. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. It is also interesting to the note that the Tier-1 and Tier-2 auditors issued 68.3 percent and 13.5 percent of the qualified opinion statements, respectively. Contrary to disagreement in audit fees, the most stated reason for change of auditors, the recent frequent issuance of qualified opinion statements by prestigious auditors could explain the reason for the high incidence of auditor changes.
<Insert Table A3> 
